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Brock Bahler
Kierkegaard’s View of Religious 
Pluralism in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript
IntroductIon
While the issue of religious pluralism, or inclusivism, seems implicit 
throughout the Postscript,1 perhaps even constantly lingering on the fringes, it is 
not the central question of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author, Johannes Cli-
macus.2 This should make us pause in raising the issue. Before asking whether 
one can insert any other religion in Climacus’s account of subjectivity, or point-
ing to Climacus’s existentialist structure as a metatheory that can be found in 
any way of being or God-relation,3 it is critical to consider what Climacus him-
self writes on the subject. Of course, since he suggests that everything he writes 
“is to be understood in such a way that it is revoked” (CUP 619), we should be 
1. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard and 
Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); hereafter cited in text and notes as CUP.
2. Out of respect for Kierkegaard’s own request to view the pseudonymous authors as the author 
of each text, I will refer to Johannes Climacus, rather than Kierkegaard, throughout this essay. For 
more on this matter, see Kierkegaard’s “A First and Last Explanation,” CUP 625–30. 
3. As seen, for example in Heidegger’s Being and Time or Derrida’s later and more religious works. 
For appropriations of Kierkegaard in Heidegger and Derrida, see Roger Poole, “The Unknown 
Kierkegaard: Twentieth-Century Receptions,” The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair 
Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 48–75;  John 
Caputo, “Looking the Impossible in the Eye: Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Repetition of Religion,” 
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2002): 1–25.
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wary of concluding we have arrived at an authoritative account. Indeed, anyone 
who references the text as an “authority,” according to Climacus, “has eo ipso 
misunderstood it” (618).
Nevertheless, in reading the text, one is constantly tossed between Clima-
cus’s many statements that seem to offer varying views on the issue of pluralism. 
On the one hand, he bespeaks an openness to multiple faith-practices, stating 
that “whether Christianity is in the right, I do not decide” (CUP 369). He claims 
to represent a departure from the objective introductions to Christianity which 
tout the “superiority of Christianity over paganism, Judaism, etc” (383). And he 
famously asks: “If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with 
knowledge of the true idea of God, the house of God… and prays in untruth, 
and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of in-
finity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is 
there more truth?” (201). At the same time, in other passages Climacus pushes 
for the uniqueness of Christianity, stating: “Christianity is the only historical 
phenomenon that… has wanted to be the single individual’s point of departure 
for his eternal consciousness” (15, my emphasis). “Christianity wants to lead the 
subject to the ultimate point of his subjectivity” (57, my emphasis). And finally, 
“To understand oneself in existence is also the Christian principle” (353). In light 
of these seemingly conflicting statements, I suggest that an ear to Climacus’s ac-
count of Socrates—leading to his account of Religiousness A and Religiousness 
B—provides a basic hermeneutic for handling the question of religious plural-
ism in the Postscript. 
Before arriving at this point, however, I must reemphasize that the ques-
tion, does this understanding of subjective truth open the door for other reli-
gions? is simply not a question Climacus would ask, for it elevates the objec-
tive over the subjective or single individual. Climacus is not concerned with 
the fate of other individuals, but states that he should only focus on himself: “I 
believe it would be appropriate discourse for a truly religious person if he said: 
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I do not doubt anyone’s salvation; the only one I have fears about is myself ” 
(CUP 389n).4 The question of the God-relation is always one’s personal “affair” 
(561), and “the religious person does not allow himself to be disturbed by com-
parison with others” (582). He “forbids all comparison between individuals” 
(598), whether it concerns the question of one’s adherence to Christianity5 or 
the God-relation of other cultures. While he criticizes the System for reducing 
China and Persia to a mere paragraph (133, 150–51, 150n, 154)—this reference to 
the “System” being a specific reference to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, where an-
cient China and Persia are allotted a few pages in comparison to the heightened 
emphasis Hegel places on the German philosophy of his day—his response is 
not to try to do a better job of incorporating other cultures, but rather, to leave 
the question undecided, and like Socrates, to refrain from speaking about what 
he does not know.6 
Second, clearly Climacus’s deep interest in the religious, in the passion-
ate God-relation that constitutes true human subjectivity, is situated within the 
confines of (Danish and Lutheran) Christianity. It is a response to Christen-
dom, which had made being a Christian just as natural as being human7—“as a 
4. The religious individual is “not at all concerned whether everyone else is regarded as being 
religious” (CUP 508; cf. 436–37). 
5. No doubt, Kierkegaard/Climacus is quite critical of what passes for “Christian” throughout 
Denmark, but that does not negate the fact that it remains the issue of the single individual: “Of 
course, to become a [cheap] edition of a Christian in all comfort is much easier, and just as good as 
the highest—after all, he is baptized, has received a copy of the Bible and a hymnbook as a gift; is 
he not, then, a Christian…? But that remains the business of the person involved” (CUP 557). This 
remained Kierkegaard’s (attempted) position throughout his career, writing in his late, self-authored 
work, “But I have attacked no one, saying that he is not a Christian; I have passed judgment on no 
one.” Kierkegaard, The Point of View, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 15.
6. The human “must not go to the trouble of switching over to China and Persia…since it knows 
that the task is not to move from the individual to the race but from the individual through the race 
(the universal) to reach the individual” (CUP 428; cf. 464). This, according to Climacus, is also the 
way of Socrates (469). Clearly, Climacus has the Socrates of the Apology in mind, who narrates how 
he goes around from the poets, the craftsmen, and the orators only to find that all of them speak on 
subjects outside their areas of expertise.
7. At the same time, while Climacus disagrees with those trying “to naturalize Christianity, so 
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matter of course” (CUP 368, 373, 379, 588; cf. 367n)—a plea that those who are 
‘Christian’ no longer settle for a “baptized paganism” and truly become a Chris-
tian (368; cf. 366). Thus, the Postscript only considers two positions—Christi-
anity and paganism—and it is from paganism that Climacus takes Christianity’s 
“point of departure” (361–62). Here, interestingly enough, in a book heavily fo-
cused on critiquing Hegel’s System, we find an intriguing affinity between Clima-
cus’s and Hegel’s respective projects.8  
SocrateS 
Climacus suggests Christianity finds its “point of departure” from pagan-
ism through Socrates, whose passionate inwardness serves as a “[quasi-]ana-
logue” to faith, or the absurd (CUP 205; cf. 503, 566). Paganism’s pantheism fails 
on two counts: (1) by annulling human existence through Platonic participation 
in Being (ousia), it leads to a “debauched contempt for individual human beings” 
(355),9 and thus, (2) claims to offer the human a direct relation to God, which 
is idolatry (243, 245, 246, 599, 600). Socrates, so it seems, is able to rise above 
that in the end to be a Christian and to be a human being are identical” (CUP 367n), some of his 
own statements about the relation between Christianity and subjectivity are equally problematic. 
Climacus writes, “It is really the God-relationship that makes a human being a human being” (244; 
cf. 353).  So then, one is not born a Christian, but is it fair to say that one can only truly become 
a human being by becoming a Christian, to oppose a naturalized Christianity and yet condone a 
Christianized natural state as the only true natural state? Kierkegaard, no doubt, would admit that the 
God-relationship can be observed outside of Christianity—Socrates in paganism and Abraham and 
Job in Judaism serves as some of his chief archetypes throughout his pseudonymous works—but as 
we shall see later, it still seems he establishes a hierarchy between the Christian God-relation and all 
others. 
8. H. S. Harris comments that Hegel developed his system as an “answer to the problem that 
troubled him from his schooldays onwards: ‘Why did Christianity triumph over paganism?’” H.S. 
Harris, Hegel: Phenomenology and System (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 251.
9. Cf. CUP 122, 313. Climacus appears to be referring to Platonic participation when he speaks of 
“pantheism, the taking of oneself out of existence back into the eternal through recollection, where-
by all existence-decisions become only shadow-play compared with what is eternally decided from 
behind…. The pantheist is eternally reassured backward” (226). Again, this should also be seen as 
a criticism of Hegel, whose Phenomenology of Spirit ends in a sort of pantheism where the history of 
human consciousness, or Spirit, turns out to be the “biography of God.” Harris, Hegel: Phenomenology 
and System, 81. 
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these criticisms, representing the “most decisive heterogeneity possible” within 
paganism (368). Climacus praises the “Socratic secret” that truth involves an 
inner, subjective “transformation” (38),10 the “Socratic ignorance” that does not 
speak directly to God “for fear of talking a lot of nonsense” (202; 90n), and the 
“Socratic wisdom” that is to know one is an “existing person” (204). “Socrates’ 
infinite merit is precisely that of being an existing thinker” (205; cf. 208), which 
makes him “in the truth in the highest sense within paganism” (204).
Critical to his praise of Socrates is the scene at the end of Plato’s Apology 
where he fearlessly accepts death in light of his positing the possibility in a posi-
tive afterlife, staking everything on the “if there is an immortality” (CUP 201). 
He “dares to die, and with the passion of the infinite” (201). He banks all of his 
eternal happiness on an “objective uncertainty” (205), a leap, a decision, which 
is what makes it analogous to faith. Climacus goes so far even to call it the “So-
cratic paradox,” namely “that the eternal truth [i.e., immortality] was related to 
an existing person [i.e., Socrates, the finite human]” (207). Yet, Climacus sug-
gests we must “go beyond” Socrates and obtain a “more inward expression” of 
subjective truth (207). But this is not fully explicated until he famously distin-
guishes between Religiousness A and Religiousness B. 
Religiousness A
Both Religiousness A and B “have passed through the ethical” (CUP 388), 
and thus, represent instances of subjectivity, express one’s “relation to an eternal 
10. Once again, we must note the tension here between Kierkegaard/Climacus and Hegel, for in 
Hegel’s account of Socrates, this is precisely why Hegel is critical of the ancient sage. For Hegel, So-
crates represents “the principle of subjectivity—of the absolute inherent independence of Thought. 
…He taught that man has to discover and recognize in himself what is the Right and Good….So-
crates…posited the Individual as capable of a final moral decision, in contraposition to Country and 
to customary Morality, and thus made himself an oracle, in the Greek sense. He said that he had a 
[daimonion] within him, which counseled him what to do…. The rise of the inner world of Subjectiv-
ity was the rupture with the existing Reality.” As a result, Hegel writes, “Many citizens now seceded 
from practical and political life, to live in the ideal world,” and Socrates’ questioning of the “Custom 
Morality” of the state turned out to be the “ruin of the Athenian state.” Hegel, The Philosophy of His-
tory, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 269–70.
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happiness” (559), and serve as examples of a God-relation. However, there are 
key differences between the two. Religiousness A is chiefly described as a kind of 
God-relation “not conditioned by a something but is the dialectical inward deep-
ening of the relation, consequently conditioned only by the inward deepening” 
(556). In other words, it entails an awareness of oneself as an existing individual 
who seeks to “know thyself ” through inwardly “reflecting upon existing” as an 
effort to connect the [finite] self with the infinite (570). Clearly, Climacus has 
Socrates in mind, and Climacus maintains this “pathos-filled” life is obtainable 
by anyone, regardless of religious affiliation, who “venture[s] everything upon 
the ‘if ’ of immortality” (429; cf. 278–79; 557), for its basic premise is simply 
“universal human nature” (559; cf. 584).
This is the religiousness observed in paganism, not to mention certain po-
sitions within Christianity. Climacus has in mind here those who reduce the 
Christian life to spiritual trial or suffering—the Christian ascetic, mystic of the 
Middle Ages, or monk. They commit to a kind of Christianity saturated with 
Platonic participation and believe only certain lifestyles and activities are ac-
ceptable for a God-relation. This kind of Christianity is thoroughly pagan and 
is marred by a “split” in thought, a dualism between the sacred and the secular 
(cf. CUP 461, 473–74, 492).11 And while Religiousness A is surely better than 
much of the esthetic and ethical ways of living Climacus observes—especially 
of Hegelians who forget to exist at all (305–06)—it suffers from simultaneously 
remaining in the sphere of “immanence” and only having a negative relation to 
the eternal (560). Without any external polestar, its subjectivity only reflects on 
itself and its own understanding. Thus, in order to reach the eternal, this turn 
inward requires a “self-annihilation before God” (572). The individual must set 
“himself aside in order to find God, since it is the individual himself who is the 
11. In other pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard is also quite critical of the monastic movement. 
See, for example, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (New York: Penguin, 
2003), 123–25; The Concept of Anxiety,  ed. and trans. Reidar Thomte with Albert B. Anderson (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 106.
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hindrance” (560). In other words, Climacus’s concerns with pantheism remain, 
as the individual is “cleared out,” and ultimately “sinks” or is “swallowed” by the 
eternal (560, 561, 573). 
Religiousness B
Religiousness B also espouses an inwardness and even claims to be the 
“greatest possible” level of inwardness (CUP 572). Here, Climacus speaks of the 
“knight of hidden inwardness” (499, 500)—a clear reference to Kierkegaard’s 
earlier pseudonymous works but claiming certain differences. Climacus views 
the “knight of faith” in Fear and Trembling as “only a rash anticipation” of the 
religiousness set forth in the Postscript. He finds problematic that the knight of 
faith is depicted in a “state of completeness” and that there is a contradiction in 
that Johannes de Silentio is able to observe the knight of faith, which should be 
impossible if faith is subjective or inward (500–01n).12
The inwardness of Religiousness B is not a sheer immanence, but is para-
doxically related to “something outside the individual.” This gives the impression 
of a mere “esthetic relationship,” but in actual fact, it is “the absolute relationship 
with God…. The paradoxical upbuilding therefore corresponds to the category 
of God in time as an individual human being” (CUP 561). In other words, Reli-
giousness B, or the “paradoxical-religious” (570, 573), goes beyond both paganism 
and reason—representing a “break with all thinking” into “the sphere of faith” 
12. This one footnote strikes at the very heart at the question in this paper. For, it would be easy 
if looking at Kierkegaard’s entire pseudonymous corpus to, at the very least, include Judaism as an 
option for achieving the proper [paradoxical] God-relation, as Abraham and Job are given as chief 
examples. The implication in this footnote, however, is that just as the knight of faith is an “anticipa-
tion’ of the knight of hidden inwardness, Climacus views the external, law-based [though neverthe-
less still capable of paradox] faith observed in the Old Testament as an anticipation of the inward, 
subjective faith of the New Testament, or Christianity (a common view of the Old Testament by 
thinkers as varied as Aquinas and Luther). It would be hard to imagine, however, that Climacus 
would place Judaism within the same structure as paganism. If Christianity is “the sharpest contrast 
to paganism” (369), perhaps Judaism is another contrast, but not as extremely juxtaposed to pagan-
ism because it is not as paradoxical (perhaps, then, Judaism would be Religiousness A.2 or Reli-
giousness B-Beta Version?).
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(579)—precisely because it makes the paradoxical claim to relate to the eternal 
“in time” (570). 
Climacus is actually making two claims here. First, there is the obvious 
reference to the God-man. Here what is paradoxical or “absurd” is the claim 
that God, who “according to its nature cannot become historical” does indeed 
come into existence, a “fact” which is precisely the essence of Christianity (CUP 
385; cf. 326).13 Second, in contrast to the pagan’s self-annihilation, Climacus 
is making the (absurd) claim that one can have a relation with the eternal in 
time—that one can be eternal in time (cf. 573). Rather than annulling individual 
existence (as in A), this paradoxical God-relation “is connected essentially with 
being a human being, and qualitatively with each human being in particular” 
(566). Instead of the sheer immanence in paganism, “Christianity indeed para-
doxically accentuates existing” and “breaks with immanence and makes existing 
the absolute contradiction—not within immanence but in opposition to imma-
nence. There is no immanental underlying kinship between the temporal and 
the eternal, because the eternal itself has entered into time and wants to estab-
lish kinship there” (572–73). 
Here, then, we see why Climacus views Religiousness B as going beyond 
the religiousness found in Socrates. The existence of the “Greek philosopher…
yields passion, but existence accentuated paradoxically yields the maximum of 
passion” (CUP 354). The pagan can lead a “pathos-filled” life and emphasize the 
importance of being a particular individual, banking everything on the “‘if ’ of 
immortality,” but Religiousness B requires more, namely that the individual also 
“risk his thought, venture to believe against understanding” (429).
13. That Christianity is based on a “fact,” would imply that some level of content is important for 
Climacus’s account of subjective truth. However, one is left fumbling in trying to understand the 
difference between a “doctrine” and a “fact” in his account.  
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concluSIon
There remain plenty of questions we could ask Climacus: Is Christianity 
the only religion to boast the importance of a subjective inwardness? Is the God 
of Christianity the only one concerned with the particular individual? Could 
it be that other religions are based on an absolute paradox? But Climacus will 
not give an ear to such questions. He is infinitely, passionately interested in his 
question, his life, his religiousness, his relation to God. We may fault him for not 
having eyes big enough to consider the religions of the rest of the world; but, 
perhaps, to ask the question of other religions is to annul the subjective view-
point. 
Climacus’s intense focus on the single individual, in contradistinction to 
the emphasis on the concept, the abstract, and the universal, then, should cause 
us to question if the appropriation of Kierkegaard’s religious views into some 
kind of meta-theory or structure of religious experience as really just a return 
to Hegel. Derrida, for example, once claimed that “it is Kierkegaard to whom I 
have been most faithful.”14 Yet, Derrida’s concept of a “religion without religion” 
as a general structure or “axiom of impossibility” requires a removal of any par-
ticularistic or determinant aspects of Kierkegaard’s category, “the religious,” and 
thus, would involve a complete removal of any connections it may have with 
Christianity.15 For Derrida/Caputo, “God” is conflated with “the impossible,” 
resulting in “the endless translatability and substitutability of these names” and 
“a wall of undecidability.”16 
While such a move may have some linguistic merit—although it seems to 
result in a bit of a tautology17—as well as reflecting the contemporary desire for a 
14. Qtd. in John Llewelyn, Margins of Religion: Between Kierkegaard and Derrida (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 2009), 1. 
15. Caputo, “Looking the Impossible in the Eye: Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Repetition of 
Religion,” 8, 22. 
16. Ibid., 21. 
17. For example, Caputo states early on in the essay, “We must be driven to the point … where we 
see the impossibility that without God we cannot so much as take a walk in the Deer Park” (Ibid., 
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more inclusive and pluralistic attitude toward religion, it must be acknowledged 
that such a turn reflects a betrayal of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the God-
relation and the particularistic nature of the existential condition. Conflating 
God to an abstract concept like “the impossible,” is a Hegelian movement that 
Kierkegaard (at least here in the Postscript) would most certainly criticize, just 
as much as he would be critical of Hegelian movements which reduce the God-
relation to one’s duty to love thy neighbor—which is precisely how the Phenom-
enology of Spirit ends, where “Reason’s Law is the law of universal Charity”18—a 
move which removes any notion of transcendence and limits human activity to 
the political/ethical realm.19 Kierkegaard/Climacus would be staunchly opposed 
to any of the philosophical movements which locate the telos of Christianity in a 
secular modernity and reduces all the claims of Christianity to the imperative of 
love for one’s neighbor, which reflect not only the position of Derrida/Caputo20 
but also Žižek’s “Christian atheism”21 and Vattimo’s secular nihilism.22
For Climacus, if the single individual has not banked his entire life and 
eternal happiness on Christianity, if he has not taken the particular leap of faith 
that constitutes Christianity, is it not a bit disingenuous? To hold back and lay 
13–14). If we are to agree with him that “the impossible” can be a suitable replacement for the name 
of “God,” the above quotation would be reduced to saying “we see the impossibility that without 
the impossible we cannot so much as take a walk in the Deer Park,” and one of the integral verses to 
which Kierkegaard often alludes to throughout his corpus would then read “for with the impossible 
nothing will be impossible” (cf. Luke 1:37). 
18. Harris, Hegel: Phenomenology and System, 91.
19. Cf. Fear and Trembling, 96, where Johannes de Silentio begins his Problema II with this very 
point. 
20. For more on Caputo’s position, see Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion 
Without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Caputo, On Religion (London: 
Routledge, 2001).
21. Cf. Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, ed. Creston 
Davis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
22. Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002). We could also add to this list Heidegger’s demythologizing of the Christian narrative to an 
ontological-existential philosophy of Being in Being and Time, as well as Alain Badiou’s reading of 
Christian themes through the lens of secular atheism in his book, St. Paul: The Founder of Universalism, 
trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
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claims to multiple faith-traditions simultaneously would not be to embrace any 
one paradox, be in subjective relation to the God, exhibit any kind of devotion or 
pathos, or take any risk—and, “Without risk, no faith” (CUP 204)—but, rather, 
would appear to objectively keep one’s options open, like increasing one’s odds 
of winning a gamble in a horse race by betting on every horse. In contrast, Cli-
macus concludes: “Religiousness B is isolating, separating, is polemical. Only 
in this condition do I become blessed, and as I absolutely bind myself to it, I 
thereby exclude everyone else. This is the impetus of particularism in the ordi-
nary pathos” (582).
